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x.com/DeItaone/status/2102036088801902733 ↗
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OpenAI is better at announcing when thresholds have been met than DeepMind (and perhaps better than Anthropic as well), so I do not expect there to be the same level of delay in announcing that a threshold has been crossed as has been the case with the other leading AI companies. Thus, it's worthwhile to mainly focus on the definitions as opposed to the technicalities of when OpenAI would plan to announce that a threshold has been met (after it has been met). However, as the capabilities we are
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As Sergio made clear in his comment, a lot of this might come down to technicalities based on when DeepMind explicitly mentions that a threshold has been met. This is also complicated by the fact that the definitions change quite frequently. Thus, much of the forecasting for this question will be based on the technicality, and perhaps this might not capture what this question is trying to elicit. Regardless, here are my forecasts for each option:
CBRN Uplift 1 - As this has likely already been
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Both AI R&D-4 and CBRN-4 are high thresholds to pass, although AI capabilities improvements have been carrying along very quickly. However, there are some variables outside of AI research that are important to remember when thinking about forecasting when these thresholds will be released:
It's not inevitable that AI companies are financially able to carry on full-speed ahead with their research until the end of 2030, as there is a very real chance of a major market correction. OpenAI and An
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As with the Anthropic question, the requirement of an official public report that explicitly mentions a capability threshold being met is reasonable for the sake of a clear resolution, but introduces noise with respect to forecasts about the underlying reality. So far, it does not seem like Anthropic, DeepMind, or OpenAI have ever clearly stated that some high threshold has definitely been crossed, beyond precautionary language, alert thresholds, cannot "rule out" language, or the case of OpenAI
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Some disconnected, rough thoughts:
As far as I can tell from some research, Anthropic hasn’t yet even clearly stated that they have crossed the CBRN-3 threshold (“the ability to significantly assist
individuals or groups with basic STEM backgrounds in obtaining, producing, or deploying CBRN weapons”), although they did activate ASL-3 protections. In general, it seems that the standards of evidence they are using for the “rule in” thresholds of capability are high, and I also expect they don’t
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My general distribution at the moment is extremely rough, and I would likely adjust it a lot with further time and reflection. It probably does not add much to, and possibly actually detracts from, the general observations in this comment.
I'm now conditioning on Antistatic actually existing to resolve questions.
A very large part of the question seems to depend on sociopolitical dynamics about unemployment insurance, UBI-like programs, creation of fake jobs, the possibility of transitions to
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I don't think the PLA purges mean much of anything. The PLA has a longstanding modernization program dedicated to producing an army that can take Taiwan if the political leadership decides it needs to. A few sackings/eliminations, even of elite generals, are not going to change the PLA's trajectory nor IMO do they tell us much about how the political leadership perceives PLA readiness: there are a LOT of plausible reasons to purge someone, ranging from genuine corruption and incompetence to poli
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Citrini (@citrini): “The difference in Strait activity from when #3 first arrived / began observing the strait about 4-5 days ago to today is stark. Traffic has meaningful”
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Resolved the first week:
Date
Day
n_total
March 16
Mon
4
March 17
Tue
2
March 18
Wed
1
March 19
Thu
3
March 20
Fri
6
March 21
Sat
0
March 22
Sun
3
Weekly total
19
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Sentinel forecasters in their latest newsletter said the following:
Will the US place 1,000 or more boots on the ground in Iran before July 2026? Our forecasters think there’s a 37% chance (14% to 55%).
Will the US place >10,000 boots on the ground before July? Our forecasters think there’s a 13.5% probability (4% to 27%).
I'm at 50% and 11% on these thresholds for June currently
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Contrary to what Trump claims, there are no ongoing negotiations between Iran and the United States.
Indirect messages have reached Iran, but they do not include any proposals of value or worthy of consideration. Moreover, the channel for sending these one-sided messages has been ongoing since the beginning of the war.
Iran will continue the war until it achieves its objectives, and there is a conviction that the five-day deadline announced by Trump is nothing but a trick to lower Iran's level
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USS Tripoli (LHA-7), USS New Orleans (LPD-18) and elements of the embarked 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit are getting closer to the Middle East after transiting the Strait of Malacca this week. USS San Diego (LPD-22), which was operating with Tripoli and New Orleans earlier this month, is now in port in Sasebo, Japan, according to a U.S. Pacific Fleet spokesperson.
— US Naval Institute
A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is a ~2,200–2,400 Marine rapid-deployment force sized to fit a standard thre
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Normally it's 565–655/week (±1σ from 610 calls/week)
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- Week ending 2026-03-08: 34 (4+5+3+4+5+7+6)
- Week ending 2026-03-15: 41 (9+4+5+8+3+3+9)
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Although the strait is 21 miles wide at its narrowest point, there are only two 1.86-mile stretches where water is deep enough for large oil tankers to pass, given how low these ships sit in the water. “This creates a two-lane highway for large vessels, one lane in and one out. The bottleneck here could last a few weeks at the very least,” he said.
— WSJ
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Very unlikely in the next couple of years given the extensive purges in the PLA.